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Introduction
By Brett G. Scharffs.∗
It is my pleasure to welcome you to the American Association of
Law Schools’ 2004 Law and Religion Section Meeting and to thank
our distinguished panel for being with us to address the topic, “One
Nation Under God? Unity, Diversity, and Neutrality Under the
Religion Clauses.” We meet in interesting times, when questions
about the proper place of religion in public life and public support
for religious life are matters of deep and spirited national concern.
The questions we address today are not esoteric matters of interest
only to specialists, although our panelists bring a depth, care, and
subtlety of thinking to these issues that is often lacking from the
heated political and journalistic discourse that has been notable
mostly for its volume, in the many senses of that word.
When the Ninth Circuit held in Newdow v. United States
Congress.1 that California’s policy of requiring the recitation of the
Pledge of Allegiance in public school classrooms was an
unconstitutional establishment of religion due to the Pledge’s
inclusion of the words “under God,”2 the political reaction was swift
and negative. Lawmakers on both sides of the aisle condemned the
ruling as “ridiculous,” “nuts,” and “stupid,”3 and, in response, both
houses of Congress passed resolutions by overwhelming margins in

∗ Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University; B.S.B.A.,
M.A., Georgetown University; B.Phil, Oxford University; J.D., Yale Law School. I would like
to thank Tom Berg, Fred Gedicks, Steve Gey, and Frank Ravitch for their thoughtful and
provocative contributions to the Law and Religion Section Meeting in Atlanta, Georgia, on
January 3, 2004. I would also like to thank the editors of the BYU Law Review for publishing
these proceedings. Professor Thomas C. Berg’s presentation was based in large part upon his
article, The Pledge of Allegiance and the Limited State, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 41 (2003),
which is not reproduced here.
1. 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002), amended by 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub
nom. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004).
2. Id. at 607–12.
3. Steven G. Gey, “Under God,” the Pledge of Allegiance, and Other Constitutional
Trivia, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1865, 1866 (2003) (citations omitted) (quoting the statements of
President Bush, Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, and Senator Byrd). For a summary of
the political firestorm, see id. at 1866–68 & nn.2–5.
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support of the Pledge.4 Upon reflection, however, many
commentators weighed in with the view that the Ninth Circuit’s
analysis represented a faithful application of what can only be
described as the Supreme Court’s confusing and chaotic doctrine
governing this area of the law.5 When the case went before the
Supreme Court, dozens of amici lined up on each side of the issue.6
(Since the Section meeting in January 2004, the Supreme Court held
that Michael Newdow, as a noncustodial parent, did not have
standing in the case.7 The immediate effect of this holding was a
reversal of the Ninth Circuit, but the outcome was widely viewed as
a postponement of the Pledge issue.)8
While the Pledge case set off political shock waves, it was not the
only recent case involving religion in public life to touch raw nerves.
In the twelve months since last we met, the case reporters and
headlines have been filled with controversies involving the Free
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. Even a brief and
partial recitation of the issues and cases during the year 2003 makes
clear that a deep and wide division exists in our country on matters
involving public support of religion, the proper relationship of
church and state, and the acceptable limits of religious expression in
the public square.

4. See id. at 1867–68 nn.6–7.
5. See, e.g., id. at 1870, 1880–84; Linda P. McKenzie, The Pledge of Allegiance: One
Nation Under God?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 379 (2004). McKenzie describes the confusion of
Supreme Court Establishment Clause doctrines:
The current Pledge of Allegiance predicament is the direct result of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s failure to provide adequate direction to the lower courts for
determining whether a challenged government action violates the Establishment
Clause. In fact, the Court itself has applied no less than three different tests to such
challenges. The choice of which test to apply is further complicated by the fact that
the Court continues to develop new tests without specifically overruling any of its
prior Establishment Clause doctrines.
Id. at 383–84 (footnotes omitted).
6. See Brett G. Scharffs, Is the Pledge of Allegiance an Unconstitutional Establishment of
Religion?, PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CAS., Mar. 15, 2004, at 304, 310–11 (listing amici).
7. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2310–11 (2004).
8. See, e.g., Joyce Howard Price, Justices Refuse to Reopen Pledge Case, WASH. TIMES,
Aug. 24, 2004, at A07 (commenting that people both for and against the constitutionality of
the Pledge as it exists were disappointed that the Supreme Court struck down the Ninth
Circuit’s ruling “on a technicality,” leaving open the opportunity for other parents to pursue a
similar case in the future).
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For example:
•
In Alabama, attorneys sued Chief Justice Roy Moore of the
Alabama Supreme Court, alleging that he violated the
Establishment Clause by placing a large stone monument
engraved with the Ten Commandments in the Alabama State
Judicial Building. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld a federal district court judge’s conclusion that the
display violated the Establishment Clause.9 A showdown over
the rule of law ensued when Chief Justice Moore refused to
remove the display, and an Alabama judicial ethics panel
eventually removed him from office.10 Demonstrators,
including one dressed as Moses carrying cardboard tablets,
protested outside the state court building in support of
Moore,11 but the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari in the case.12
•

In contrast, a Kentucky federal district court, the Fifth
Circuit in a Texas case, and the Third Circuit in a
Pennsylvania case each held that the display of the Ten
Commandments in public buildings does not violate the
Establishment Clause.13

9. Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1297 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, Moore v.
Glassroth, 124 S. Ct. 497 (2003). In a related case, McGinley v. Houston, 282 F. Supp. 2d
1304 (M.D. Ala. 2003), a federal district court held that the associate justices of the Alabama
Supreme Court did not violate the Establishment Clause and unconstitutionally establish a
religion of “nontheistic beliefs” by removing the monument depicting the Ten
Commandments from the rotunda of the Alabama State Judicial Building in order to comply
with a federal court injunction. For a discussion of the factual and legal issues in the Alabama
Ten Commandments case, see Gabriël A. Moens, The Menace of Neutrality in Religion, 2004
BYU L. REV. 535.
10. See Alabama Chief Justice Removed from Office, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/
LAW/11/13/moore.tencommandments/index.html (Nov. 14, 2003).
11. See Supreme Court Rejects Ten Commandments Monument Appeal: Decision Lets
Stand Alabama Decision to Remove Statue, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/11/03/
scotus.tencommandments.ap/index.html (Nov. 3, 2003).
12. Moore v. Glassroth, 124 S. Ct. 497 (2003).
13. See Freethought Soc’y of Greater Phila. v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247 (3d Cir.
2003) (reversing a district court holding that an eighty-two-year-old Ten Commandments
plaque displayed on the façade of a county courthouse violated the Establishment Clause); Van
Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 2004 LEXIS 6691 (Oct. 12,
2004) (holding that a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of the state capitol
does not violate the First Amendment); ACLU v. Mercer County, 240 F. Supp. 2d 623 (E.D.
Ky. 2003) (holding that the display of the Ten Commandments in a county courthouse does
not violate the Establishment Clause).
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•

Other federal courts did find Establishment Clause violations
in cases involving displays of the Ten Commandments in
public places. In a case from Wisconsin,14 the city of La
Crosse sold a small parcel of land containing a display of the
Ten Commandments to a fraternal organization, built a fence
around the monument, and posted a sign disclaiming
endorsement of a religious message. Nevertheless, a federal
district court judge held that the city had violated the
Establishment Clause and compelled the resale of the land to
the city and the removal of the monument.15

•

Controversy also erupted when the National Park Service
included in its Grand Canyon bookstore a book defending
the creationist view that the Grand Canyon was formed as a
result of the great flood described in the book of Genesis and
is thus only a few thousand years old.16 Critics complained
that “the book is the latest example that the National Park
Service has caved to pressure from conservative and
fundamentalist Christian groups, accommodating their
requests to post or alter materials.”17 This controversy came
on the heels of the National Park Service’s removing (after
receiving complaints from civil libertarians) and then
returning (while officials took a second look at the issue)
public displays quoting the Bible, which a religious group
placed at scenic overlooks of the South Rim of the Grand
Canyon over thirty years ago.18 In that instance, the issue was
turned over to the Justice Department to determine whether

14. Mercier v. City of La Crosse, 276 F. Supp. 2d 961 (W.D. Wis. 2003).
15. Id.; see also ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2003), cert.
granted, 2004 LEXIS 6693 (Oct. 12, 2004) (concluding that predominant purpose of Ten
Commandments displays in county schools and courthouses was religious); Chambers v. City
of Frederick, 292 F. Supp. 2d 766 (D. Md. 2003) (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss a
suit against a city, mayor, and fraternal organization, alleging the violation of the
Establishment Clause when the city sold to the fraternal organization a city park that contained
a monument of the Ten Commandments).
16. See Issue of Religious Displays Before National Park Service, at http://www.
cnn.com/2004/LAW/01/07/religious.displays.ap (Jan. 7, 2004).
17. Id.
18. Id.
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the plaques should be taken down permanently or remain at
the park.19

•

In Locke v. Davey,20 the Supreme Court upheld, against a
Free Exercise challenge, a Washington State scholarship
program that excluded divinity students from eligibility.21

•

In Florida, a church successfully challenged a county’s refusal
to permit it to display an overtly religious display at the
county’s holiday festival. The court did order, however, that
the display be modified to explicitly indicate that the message
was from the church, not the county.22

•

Additionally, cases were decided holding that a Christian
prayer offered by a school board member at a high school
graduation ceremony was private speech, not state-sponsored
speech,23 that a suppertime prayer given by the college
superintendent at a state-operated military college violated
the Establishment Clause by coercing religious worship,24
and that a county board policy of inviting only
representatives of the Judeo-Christian tradition to offer
invocations at public sessions violated the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise rights of plaintiff, a Wiccan
religion practitioner.25

•

Concerned with the Tenth Circuit’s ruling in Summum v.
City of Ogden26 that a city cannot display the Ten
Commandments while declining to display other monuments
that espouse differing religious or political views, a city

19. See Religious Displays Spur Debate in Nation’s Parks, at http://edition.
cnn.com/2004/TRAVEL/01/07/religious.displays.ap (Jan. 7, 2004).
20. 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004).
21. Id. at 1315.
22. Calvary Chapel Church, Inc. v. Broward County, 299 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (S.D. Fla.
2003).
23. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Sch. Dist., 340 F.3d 605 (8th Cir. 2003). Under the
circumstances in Doe, and given the board member’s status as a parent, the school district was
not held liable since the board member gave the prayer on his own initiative and not as part of
a school policy or custom. Id.
24. Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2003).
25. Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Supervisors, 292 F. Supp. 2d 805 (E.D. Va.
2003).
26. 297 F.3d 995 (10th Cir. 2002).
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council in Wyoming grappled with the issue of keeping a Ten
Commandments monument on display in its city park.27 The
city council was uneasy because a Baptist minister had asked
to place a monument in the park with an inscription
amounting to “hate speech.”28 To avoid the possible
consequences of creating a free speech forum by keeping the
Ten Commandments monument on city-owned property,
the city considered selling a small chunk of the city park to a
private party so that the monument could stay where it was.29
•

The Utah Supreme Court decided a case involving a
constitutional challenge to a city’s refusal to allow the
plaintiff to offer a prayer during the opening ceremony of a
city council meeting.30 The city claimed that it rejected the
proposed prayer because it did not fall within the subjectmatter restriction that the city had placed on the opening
ceremony, not because the city disagreed with the plaintiff.’s
religious beliefs.31 The court held that the city’s means of

27. See Brendan Burke, Ten Commandments Issue Divides Casper City Council, at
http://www.casperstartribune.net/articles/2003/10/01/news/casper/3c81eea836ea342d0a
c0d6e0cc0a4e06.txt (Oct. 1, 2003).
28. See Michelle Dynes, Monument May Get New Home: Phelps’ Threat Spurs Mayor’s
Plan to Relocate Ten Commandments, WYO. TRIB.-EAGLE, Nov. 8, 2003, at A1. Reverend Fred
Phelps of the Topeka-based Westboro Baptist Church proposed placing a memorial to the
homosexual University of Wyoming student killed in 1998, with the following inscription:
“Matthew Shepard Entered Hell Oct. 12, 1998 at age 21 In Defiance of God’s Warning:
‘Thou shalt not lie with mankind as with womankind; it is an abomination’ Leviticus 18:22.”
Id.
29. Id.
30. Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 13, 73 P.3d 325 (Utah 2003). A related
case, Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 1998), had previously gone all
the way to the Tenth Circuit.
31. Snyder, 2003 UT 13 ¶ 29, 73 P.3d at 331. A portion of the text of Snyder’s
proposed opening prayer is as follows:
OUR MOTHER, who art in heaven (if, indeed there is a heaven and if there is a
god that takes a woman’s form) hallowed be thy name, we ask for thy blessing for
and guidance of those that will participate in this meeting and for those mortals that
govern the state of Utah;
We fervently ask that you guide the leaders of this city, Salt Lake County and the
state of Utah so that they may see the wisdom of separating church and state and so
that they will never again perform demeaning religious ceremonies as part of official
government functions;
We pray that you prevent self-righteous politicians from mis-using the name of God
in conducting government meetings; and that you lead them away from the
hypocritical and blasphemous deception of the public, attempting to make the
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selecting those entitled to offer the prayer at the opening of
its city council meetings was discriminatory and not neutral;
therefore, the city’s practice constituted a direct benefit to
the exercise of religion in violation of the Utah
Constitution.32

In a society that is increasingly diverse, and in which the nature
of religious allegiances is very different than it was even a generation
ago, this Section meeting was designed to focus a critical eye on the
continuing adequacy of some of the key doctrinal concepts in Free
Exercise and Establishment Clause jurisprudence, including
neutrality, hostility, coercion, separation, and endorsement.
In his presentation, Tom Berg argues that the strongest rationale
for the constitutionality of the phrase “under God” in the Pledge is
that the phrase reinforces the idea that our nation’s government is an
institution of limited power and must recognize inalienable rights
that transcend any human authority.33 Historically—from the
founding of the Republic, to the abolitionist arguments against
slavery, to the civil rights movement—religious viewpoints have been
important to policy debates, and the Establishment Clause allows the
state to rely on religious rationales for political assertions. Thus, the
phrase “under God” may be viewed as a permissible statement of a
rationale for human rights and limited government. Professor Berg
also argues that removing “under God” from the Pledge would not
further neutrality, since omitting—or worse, eliminating—an
affirmation is not neutral. Rather, it is an assertion that the state
recognizes no authority above itself. While some may find it difficult
to pledge allegiance to the idea that we are a nation “under God,”
others would find it difficult to pledge allegiance to a state that
recognizes no limits on its power. Thus, while including “under
God” may represent a burden to atheists, excluding “under God”
would burden religious believers.
Fred Gedicks identifies what he calls a “constitutional gag
reflex,” or the “instinctive intellectual revulsion one might feel in

people believe that bureaucrat’s decisions and actions have thy stamp of approval if
prayers are offered at the beginning of government meetings . . . .
Snyder, 2003 UT 13 ¶ 5 n.1, 73 P.3d at 327 n.1.
32. Id. ¶ 30, 73 P.3d at 331–32.
33. Thomas C. Berg, The Pledge of Allegiance and the Limited State, 8 TEX. REV. L. &
POL. 41 (2003).
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response to the doctrine or holding of a case.”34 Professor Gedicks
argues that over the last twenty years, the central question of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has shifted from a concern with
the meaning of “separation” of church and state to a concern with
“treating religion neutrally or equally with respect to secular
activities.”35 The problem with neutrality, Professor Gedicks argues,
is that, taken to its logical extreme, neutrality could justify outcomes
that would trigger an Establishment Clause gag reflex, and he
provides a series of illustrative examples.36
Steven Gey suggests that while the Supreme Court has talked
about neutrality in Establishment Clause cases, its deeper concern is
with unity.37 Professor Gey argues that only a truly secular
government can lead to stable civic unity. Religion, by its very
nature, is exclusionary, and thus religion is not a promising basis for
creating political unity. Professor Gey urges that the Court should
recognize that political unity in the United States means unity
among people whose views of the ultimate good are different. While
religion is sometimes viewed as a unifier of the American people,
religion and religious differences create deep conflicts as well.
Professor Gey concludes that “[p]roponents of a religious form of
national unity are fooling themselves. If we ever achieve unity
through religion it will be a false unity, a unity of coercion and
intolerance and mandatory obeisance to the God representing
influential and politically dominant religious groups.”38
Frank Ravitch offers a searing critique of the way the Supreme
Court has used the concepts of “neutrality” and “hostility” in its
recent jurisprudence.39 Professor Ravitch argues that the concept of
neutrality is problematic because, at least in the Establishment Clause
context, neutrality does not and cannot exist. In contrast, hostility
towards religion can exist, but “the fact that hostility can exist does
not mean that the Court’s use of the concept is accurate.”40
34. Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Establishment Clause Gag Reflex, 2004 BYU L. REV.
995, 996.
35. Id. at 999.
36. Id. at 1000–04.
37. Steven G. Gey, Unity of the Graveyard and the Attack on Constitutional Secularism,
2004 BYU L. REV. 1005, 1005–06.
38. Id. at 1029.
39. Frank S. Ravitch, The Supreme Court’s Rhetorical Hostility: What Is “Hostile” to
Religion Under the Establishment Clause?, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1031.
40. Id. at 1034–35.
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Professor Ravitch maintains that when the Court employs the term
“hostility” it presumes that the lack of formal neutrality is hostile to
religion, and he argues that “this is not an adequate or accurate
definition of ‘hostility.’”41
The panel’s viewpoints and arguments are indicative of the
deeply perplexing and difficult issues that arise in this area of the law.
While the panelists’ views do not reflect a convergence of opinion,
they do reflect a high degree of respect for, and an attitude of
seriousness towards, conflicting points of view. In an area where
emotions tend to run high, this is itself an accomplishment worth
praising.

41. Id. at 1047.
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